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AUTHOR: 


PETRIE,  SIR  CHARLES 
ALEXANDER 


TITLE: 


TWO  ESSAYS  IN 
SPANISH  HISTORY 

PLACE: 

LONDON 

DA  TE : 

1922 


Restrictions  on  Use; 


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•PP 


^if^mmft 


Alexander 


Aiexanaer 
Pe trie.  Sir  Charles ij|bt.,  1895- 

Tt70  essays  in  Spanish  history,  by  C,  A.  Petrie 
•  ..   London,  Egorton,  192??. 
43  p.   23?:-  on. 

Contents, — The  Arab  conquest  of  Spain.— The 
evolution  of  Spanish  history  (711-1833)- 


1 


»         • 


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MPNUFfiCTURED   TO   flllM   STRNDRRDS 
BY   APPLIED   IMRGE,    INC. 


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TWO    ESSAYS    IN 
SPANISH  HISTORY 

By  C.  A.  PETRIE,  Ni.A.,  F.R.Hist.S. 


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London  :  Messrs.  HUGH  EGERTON  &  Co     Ltd 

40  CHARLWOOD   STREET,   WESTMINSTER.  MCMXXIL 


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TWO  ESSAYS  IN  SPANISH  HISTORY 


.'> 


Bi Ti  y  "firifffiii  M;.iiiiiiffnriHiffiMriiMiiTiMri  wm  i6iMiaij^iiwMBM«i 


Ftrst  Published^  August^  1922 


' 


i> 


TWO  ESSAYS  IN 
SPANISH   HISTORY 

By  C.  A.  PETRIE,  M.A.,  F.R.Hist.S. 


U 


LONDON:  Messrs.  HUGH  EGERTON  &  Co.,  Ltd. 
♦o  CHARLWOOD  STREET,  WESTMINSTER.      MCMXXII. 


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*-. .. 


THE  ARAB   CONQUEST 

OF  SPAIN 

THE  last  years  of  the  Visigothic  monarchy  are 
so  wrapt  in  obscurity  that  it  is  not  surprising 
to  learn  that  a  large  number  of  writers  have 
endeavoured  to  find  a  solution  of  the  problems 
presented  by  the  Arab  invasion  of  the  Iberian 
Peninsula.  Within  the  last  decade  several  important 
theories  have  been  advanced,  and  it  may  not  be 
entirely  without  interest  to  see  what  fresh  light  is  thus 
shed  upon  the  year  711  and  the  events  connected 
with  it.  To  attain  a  true  perspective  of  the 
difficulties  of  the  subject  it  is  necessary  to  trace  the 
development  of  opinion  from  the  last  half  of  the  18th 
century  when  the  views  of  Mariana  still  held  sway. 

That  writer '  narrates  the  story  of  Roderick  in  the 
form  in  which  it  had  been  told  for  many  centuries 
before  his  day.  Roderick,  the  last  Visigothic 
monarch,  was  a  usurper,  and  although  Mariana  does 
not  expressly  say  so,  he  obviously  regarded  the 
defeat  of  the  king  as  a  just  retribution  for  his 
usurpation  of  the  throne.  At  this  time  the  governor 
of  Ceuta  was  a  certain  Count  Julian,  whose  daughter, 
Cava,  had  been  sent  to  court  to  acquire  the 
accomplishments  of  the  day,  as  appears  to  have  been 
the  usual  custom.  Roderick  fell  in  love  with  the 
maiden  and  when  she  rejected  his  advances,  raped 
her.  Mariana  then  quotes  at  length  the  letter' 
which  Cava  at  once  wrote  to  her  father.     Except 


Juan  de   Mariana  :    Historin  General  de  Espafia. 
"  Ibid,   bk.  vi.,  ch.  21. 


Valencia,    1785. 


for  one  sentence  it  is  of  no  importance,  being  purely 
apocryphal: — *'  ....  En  una  palabra  :  vuestra 
hija,  vuestra  sangre,  y  de  la  alciina  Real  de  los 
Godos,  por  el  Rey  D.Rodrigo,  al  qual  estaba  (mal 
pecado)  encomendada,  como  la  oveja  al  lobo,  con 
un  maldad  increible  ha  sido  afrentada  .... 
Julian  dissembled  his  anger  until  he  had  persuaded 
Roderick  to  send  the  bulk  of  his  troops  to  the  North 
on  the  pretext  of  danger  in  that  quarter  :  he  then 
invited  the  Arabs  into  Spain,  and  in  opposing  them 
Roderick  was  killed  at  the  Battle  of  the  Guadalete. 

The  story  as  told  by  Mariana  is  closely  related 
to  several  legends  on  the  same  subject,  and  it  is  also 
interesting  as  being  the  popular  belief  before  modern 
historical  criticism  was  in  existence.  One  cannot 
help  wondering  if  the  passage  in  Cava's  letter  about 
her  royal  descent  is  the  only  solid  fact  in  the  whole 
narrative,  namely,  that  the  Arabs  came  in  the  first 
place  as  the  auxiliaries  of  an  overthrown  dynastic 
faction.  As  will  be  seen,  this  view  has  been  adopted 
by  later  writers,  but  not  in  connection  with  the 
legend  of  Cava. 

The  next  account  of  the  events  of  this  period  is 
that  of  Lafuente,'  who  obviously  does  not  agree  with 
the  story  as  told  by  Mariana  but  refuses  to  commit 
himself  definitely  to  any  one  view.  He  very  properly 
commences  by  raising  the  question'  why  Roderick 
alone  among  the  Visigothic  kings  is  called  Don,  an 
appellation  also  given  to  Julian  and  Pelayo  at  this 
period  but  not  generally  used  until  the  10th  century. 
Lafuente  says  that  Ceuta  is  believed  ('*Se  cree  que") 
to  have  belonged  to  the  Visigoths  since  the  time  of 
Sisebut,  but  he  makes  the  ground  of  Julian's 
opposition  to  Roderick  to  be  his  support  of  the  sons 
of  Witiza,  who  had  been  robbed. of  their  inheritance 
by  the  usurper.  Lafuente  repeats  the  time-honoured 
story  of  Cava,  but  does  so  expressly  on  the  authority 
of  the  chronicles  and  points  out  that  in  Arabic  Cava 


4) 


(> 


'Modesto   Lafuente:    Historia  General  de   Espafia. 
*  Ibid.  vol.  ii..  ch.  8. 

6 


Madrid.   1850. 


is  used  for  a  woman  of  ill-repute  ;  he  also  states  that 
her  real  name  was  Florinda.  This  cautious  attitude 
stands  midway  between  the  indiscriminating  mixture 
of  fact  and  fiction  contained  in  Mariana's  narrative 
and  the  various  conjectures  which  have  recently 
been  put  forward.  Lafuente  goes  on  to  say  that  in 
July,  710,  there  was  a  preliminary  raid  by  Tarifa  on 
the  Andalucian  coast,  and  in  April  of  the  following 
year  Tarik  landed  at  Algeciras  with  12,000  Berbers 
and  a  few  hundred  Arabs  and  took  Gibraltar : 
Theodomir,  governor  of  Andalucia,  tried  to  bar  the 
invaders'  progress  but  was  defeated ;  Musa,  the 
governor  of  Africa,  then  sent  5,000  horsemen  to 
join  Tarik,  and  the  final  battle  with  the  Visigoths 
took  place  on  the  banks  of  the  Guadalete  near  Jerez 
de  la  Frontera  on  31st  July,  711,  when  Roderick 
was  killed.  On  these  points  Lafuente  is  clear,  and 
he  does  not  mention  any  second  important  battle, 
though  he  does  give  an  account  of  a  treaty  with 
Theodomir  with  respect  to  Murcia.' 

After  Lafuente's  work  was  published  several 
articles'  and  monographs'  appeared  on  the  subject, 
but  the  most  important  contribution  was  undoubtedly 
that  made  by  Saavedra."  After  discussing  the 
primary  authorities,  to  whom  allusion  will  be  made 
later,  he  casts  serious  suspicion  upon  the  possession 
of  Ceuta  by  the  Visigoths  ;  he  says  that  they  may 
have  laid  claim  to  the  coasts  of  North  Africa  but 
suggests  that  their  authority  was  limited  to  that,  and 
compares  with  it  some  of  the  titles  of  modern 
Spanish  monarchs.  Saavedra  dismisses  the  story 
of   Florinda   either  as  a   myth  or   an   event   of   no 

^  Ibid,  vol.  iii.,  ch.  1. 

*  The  most   important  of  these  were  :— Oliver  y  Hurtado  :    De  la  Batalla 

de  Vejer  o  del  Kago  de  la  Janda.     (Revista  de  Espana  XL).     Perez 
de  Castro:    La  Batalla  de  Guadalete.     (Revista  de  Espana  XX.). 

'  The  most  noteworthy  are  those  of  Fernandez  Guerra  :  Caida  y  riiina 
dd  imperio  Visigotico  Espanol.  Madrid,  1883;  and  the  same  author's 
—Don  Rodrigo  y  la  Cava.  Madrid,  1877;  also  G.  Barzanallana  : 
La    Batalla    de    Guadalete.     Madrid,    1890. 

*  Eduardo  Saavedra  :   Estudio  sobre  la  Invasion  de  los  Arabes  en  Espana. 

Madrid,  1892. 


•- 1"  'irwiairtiM irin 


importance,  and  points  out  that  no  mention  of  it  is 
made  in  the  Latin  chronicles  until  the  Monk  of  Silos^ 
in  1110.  The  most  important  departure,  however, 
in  Saavedra's  treatise  is  his  statement,  on  the 
authority  of  the  Moorish  writer,  Rasis,  that 
Roderick  was  not  killed  in  his  first  battle  against 
the  Arabs  but  in  a  second  one  which  took  place  at 
Segoyuela. 

The  end  of  the  last,  and  the  beginning  of  the 
present,  century  saw  several  additions  to  the 
literature  which  had  sprung  up  concerning  the  reign 
of  Roderick,"  and  in  1906  a  very  able  article 
appeared  from  the  Rev.  R.  D.  Shaw,  D.D.,  summing 
up  the  evidence  as  it  existed  at  that  time."  After 
discussing  the  cause  of  the  weakness  of  the  Visigothic 
kingdom  in  a  more  or  less  general  manner  he 
investigates  the  difficulties  which  have  been  raised, 
and  says  that  the  position  of  Musa  is  hard  to  under- 
stand. Why  he  should  have  had  any  doubt  on  this 
matter  it  is  not  easy  to  see,  for  it  seems  perfectly 
clear  that  Musa  was  governor  of  Africa,  i.e.,  all  the 
country  to  the  West  of  Egypt,  and  that  Tarik  merely 
acted  under  his  orders.  Dr.  Shaw  dismisses  the 
story  of  Cava  as  a  pure  myth,  but  considers  that 
Julian  was  a  real  person  and  was  Byzantine  exarch 
of  Ceuta  :  he  distinguishes  carefully  between  the 
raid  of  Tarifa  in  710  and  the  invasion  of  Tarik  in 
the  following  year,  and  places  the  site  of  the  battle 
with  Roderick  at  the  Lake  of  La  Janda  ;  Dr.  Shaw 
leaves  the  question  of  Segoyuela  in  abeyance.  The 
increasing  tendency  of  historians  to  doubt  the  story 
of  Julian  and  his  daughter  is  noteworthy,  but,  as 
will  be  shown  later,  these  legends  in  no  way  conflict 
with  the  modern  theories. 

*  Among  the  articles  which  appeared  were  the  following  : — Victor 
Valaguer  :  Las  dos  "Cavas."  (La  Alhanibra  L).  Krancisco  Codera  : 
El  llamado  Condc  D.  Julian.  (Revista  de  Aragon  IIL).  Of  the 
monographs  cf  : — Cid  y  Tarpon  :  La  conqnista  de  Espana  por  los 
arabes.  Avlla,  1894  Mancheno  y  Olivares  :  I^a  Batalla  de  Barbate. 
Arcos  de  la  Frontera,   1899. 

'"  English    Historical    Review,    vol.    xx'i. 

8 


V» 


% 


In  1912  a  book"  was  published  in  which  the 
invasion  of  the  Arabs  was  attributed  solely  to  the 
sons  of  Witiza,  who  is  described  as  the  last  legitimate 
king  of  the  Goths— a  title  to  which  he  could  in 
nowise  lay  claim.  More  importance  may  be 
attached  to  the  arguments  in  this  book  which  support 
the  theory  that  the  Lake  of  La  Janda  was  the  scene 
of  the  great  battle,  and  on  this  point  the  authors' 
local  knowledge  is  of  course  invaluable."  In  the 
Cambridge  Mediaeval  History''  two  views  are  put 
forward,  by  Sefior  Altamira  and  Prof.  Becker 
respectively  :  the  former  considers  the  legend  of 
Julian  to  be  a  pure  fable,  first  mentioned  by  the 
Monk  of  Silos,  and  adopts  Saavedra's  theory  that 
Roderick  was  killed  at  Segoyuela  ;  Prof.  Becker,  on 
the  other  hand,  is  inclined  to  believe  that  Julian 
existed  in  some  form,  but  he  definitely  states  that 
Roderick  never  appeared  again  after  his  first 
encounter  with  the  invaders  :  both  writers  agree  that 
this  battle  took  place  at  the  Lake  of  La  Janda.  In 
his  own  work,"  Sefior  Altamira  goes  more  fully  into 
details  and  favours  the  theory  that  Ceuta  was 
Byzantine,  not  Visigothic  ;  he  also  fixes  the  date  of 
the  death  of  Roderick  at  Segoyuela  in  September, 
713.  The  most  recent  writer,  Sefior  Bleye,  in  his 
admirable  short  history,"  adopts  the  views  of  Sefior 
Altamira,  and  makes  the  interesting  suggestion  that 
Julian  may  have  been  a  Berber  chief  dependent  on 
the  Byzantine  Empire. 

Such  are  the  theories  which  have  been  advanced 
since  historians  began  to  break  away  from  the 
traditional  view  which  found  its  place  in  the 
narrative  of  Mariana.  It  is  now  necessary  to 
examine  the  original  authorities. 


f  1 


11 


Bernhard   and   Ellen  Whishaw  :    Arabic   Spain.     London,  1912. 

'"  Cf.    also    Roas    y    Lopez:     El    lugar    en    que    se    dio    la    batalla    del 
Guadalete.     Seville,    1911. 

Cambridge  Mediaeval  History,  vol.  ii.,  cf.  ch.  vi.  by  Rafael  Altamira 
and  ch.   xii.   by   Prof.    Becker. 

Rafael   Altamira  :    Historia  de   Espana  y  de  la  Civilizacion  Espafiola. 
Barcelona,   1913. 

"  P-  Aguado  Bleye  :   Historia  de  Espana.     Bilbao,   1918. 


13 


14 


Dr.  Shaw  quotes'"  several  Latin  writers,  but 
agrees  with  Saavedra  that  only  two  of  them  were 
contemporary  with  the  events  they  relate.  Of 
these  two,  John  of  Biclaro  is  useless,  since  his 
narrative  is  based  upon  marginal  notes  which  have 
become  incorporated  with  the  text.''  This  leaves 
Isidorus  Pacensis,  Isidore  of  Beja,  or  '^Anonyme  de 
Cordoue,"  as  he  is  variously  known."  From  internal 
evidence  this  writer  must  have  lived  in  the  South 
of  Spain,  and  in  view  of  this  fact  it  is  interesting  to 
note  that  he  says  nothing  of  either  Julian  or  Cava. 
His  silence  on  the  battle  at  Segoyuela  is  not  nearly 
so  conclusive  since  he  makes  no  mention  of  Pelayo 
or  of  the  other  early  rulers  in  the  North.  The  later 
chroniclers  lived  too  long  after  the  event  to  be  of 
much  use,"  but  it  is  to  be  noted  that  until  the  time 
of  the  Monk  of  Silos  they  did  not  materially  differ 
from  Isidore.  The  Arabs  were  dependent  upon 
oral  tradition  until  976,  and  their  accounts'"  must 
therefore  be  received  with  the  greatest  caution.  It 
is  thus  upon  one  chronicle,  whose  author  is 
uncertain,  that  history  is  dependent  for  its  know- 
ledge of  one  of  the  most  important  events  of  all 
time  :  it  is,  therefore,  upon  the  authority  of  the 
celebrated  '^Anonyme  de  Cordoue"  that  the 
following  account  of  the  last  days  of  the  Visigothic 
monarchy  is  based,  supplemented  by  the  suggestions 
of  later  writers.'' 

The  Visigoths  had  been  without  a  hereditary 
royal  house  ever  since  the  extinction  of  that  of  the 
Baits,  and  this  lack  had  seriously  compromised  the 

"^  English    Historical    Review,    vol.    xxi. 
''  Cf.  Saavedra  supra. 

"  His  work  is  entitled  "Isidori  Pacensis  Episcopi  Epitome  Imperatorum 
et  Arabum  una  cum  Hispaniae  Chronicon,"  and  was  published  at 
Pamplona  in  1615.     Cf.  also  the  edition  of  P.  J.  Tailhan.     Paris,  1885. 

"  Cf.  Chronicon  Albendense,  and  Sebastiani  Chronicon  nomine  Alfonsi 
Tertii   recens   vulgatum.     (Espafia    Sagrada  XHI.). 

"  The  chief  Arab  authorities  are   Ibn   Abd   El-Hakam,   Ibn   El-Kuthiya 
and   Fatho-b-Andaluci.  * 

^'  The  works  of  such  writers  as  Dozy,  who  were  ignorant  of  the  geography 
of  the  South  of  Spain,  have  been  ignored. 

10 


^''. 


^ 


political  stability  of  the  State.     At  the  beginning  of 

the  8th  century  a  determined  effort  appears  to  have 

been  made  by  Witiza  to  render  the  crown  hereditary 

in   his  family,   but  on   his   death   the   nobles  were 

sufficiently  strong  to  thwart  his  purpose.     "Huius 

temporibus    in    era    DCCXLVliii    anno   imperii    eius 

quarto     Arabum     LXXXXII.       Ulit     sceptra     regni 

quinque  per  annos  retinente  Rudericus  tumultuose 

regnum  hortante  senatu  invadit.""       These  words 

make  it  clear  that  Roderick's  election  was  irregular 

and  that  his  support  came  from  the  nobles,  for  no 

other    construction    can    be    put    upon    ''hortante 

senatu"  :    it   may   also   imply   some    hesitation   on 

Roderick's  part,  though  that  is  more  doubtful,  and 

one  rnust  guard  against  weighing  too  carefully  the 

meaning  of  individual  words  in  8th  century  Latin. 

Sefior  Altamira  '  says  that  Witiza  died  naturally  at 

Toledo  in   708  or  709,   and  that  on   his   death   a 

rebellion   at  once   broke  out   against   his  son   and 

successor,  Achila,  who  was  overthrown  by  Roderick. 

Achila   may    have   been    regarded   as   king   by   his 

father's  immediate  entourage,  but  the  crown  was 

cleariy  elective  :  one  is  tempted  to  think  that  he  is 

a    purely    fictitious    personage,    because    he    never 

appears  again,  and  his  brothers  Sisebut  and  Ebas 

are  afterwards  regarded  as  Witiza's  rightful  heirs; 

they  together  with  Oppas,  metropolitan  of  Sevilla, 

fled  to  Africa. 

It  is  at  this  point  that  the  Cava  incident  is 
supposed  to  take  place,  and  it  must  be  repeated 
that  the  pseudo-Isidore  makes  no  mention  either 
of  it  or  of  Julian,  while,  as  has  been  shown  above, 
several  modern  writers  have  refused  to  accept  it. 
On  the  other  hand,  although  the  legend  has  as  its 
sponsors  only  the  Monk  of  Silos  and  Arab  oral 
tradition  it  is  too  old  to  be  altogether  ignored.  With 
regard  to  Cava  or  Florinda  it  is  safe  to  say  that  no 
such  person  existed,  and  it  may  well  be  that  the 


22 


Anonyme  de  Cordoue. 

Historia  de  Espana  :   vide  supra. 


11 


m 


'.'• 


m, 


r    A 


story  of  her  misfortunes  arose  from  the  fact  that 
Kodenck  was  extremely  partial  to  the  opposite 
sex  and  that  the  ladies  of  his  court  were  not  remark- 
able for  their  virtue,  as  appears  to  have  been  the 
case.  Julian,  on  the  other  hand,  probably  did 
exist  and  Senor  Bleye's  conjecture  '  is  doubtless 
not  very  far  from  the  truth.  The  Moslem  conquest 
ot  Morth  Africa  was  extremely  recent  and  it  i& 
quite  likely  that  there  were  a  number  of  semi- 
independent  chieftains  who  still  professed  allegiance 
to  Constantinople  :  in  view  of  the  danger  to  his 
capital  the  Emperor  could  give  no  material 
support,  but  he  may  very  well  have  advised  Julian 
to  embroil  Musa  with  the  Visigoths  in  the  hope  of 
thus  diverting  a  portion  of  the  Caliph's  forces  to 
the  Western  Mediterranean.  That  part  of  the 
legend  of  Cava  which  connects  Julian  with  the 
Ciothic  royal  house  probably  arises  from  a  miscon- 
ception based  on  the  presence  of  Witiza's  sons  in 
Africa,  which  gave  a  dynastic  aspect  to  the  earlier 
stages  of  the  struggle. 

The  preliminary  raid  of  Tarifa  is  so  probable 
that  It  may  be  accepted  without  question,  as  also 
may  the  distinction  between  its  leader  and  that  of 
the  final  invasion.  The  repulse  of  Theodomir 
bears  every  mark  of  probability,  and  on  these 
points,  as  has  been  shown,  there  is  no  great  conflict 
of  opinion  :  it  is  the  scene  of  the  battle  with 
Roderick  that  has  given  rise  to  the  greatest 
discussion.  The  old  view  that  it  took  place  on  the 
Guadalete  is  almost  certainly  wrong  :  Tarik  was 
unlikely  to  advance  so  far  from  his  base  at  Algeciras 
and  Seiior  Bleye  is  probably  right  when  he 
attributes'  the  theory  to  the  fact  that  the  Arab  name 
for  the  Barbate  was  Guadabeca,  which  was  confused 
with  the  neighbouring  river.  It  can,  therefore  be 
said  with  considerable  confidence  that  the  battle  took 
place  on  the  banks  of  the  Barbate  near  its  junction 


24 


Historia  de  Espana  :   vide  supra. 
"  Ibid. 


•f..< 


with  the  Lake  of  La  Janda,  and  the  testimony  of 
nearly  all  modern  authorities  is  in  favour  of  this  site. 
Roderick  had  hurried  down  from  the  North — even 
the  legends  say  that  the  main  Visigothic  armies 
were  in  that  quarter — collecting  troops  as  he  came, 
while  Tarik  was  marching  on  Seville  at  the  instiga- 
tion of  Witiza's  sons  whose  adherents  were  waiting 
for  them  there.'"  Unless  fresh  contemporary 
evidence  becomes  available  it  is  improbable  that 
we  shall  ever  get  nearer  the  exact  truth  than  this. 

The  pseudo-Isidore  has  no  doubt  that  Roderick 
was  killed  in  this  battle  and  he  definitely  fixes  the 
length  of  his  reign — "Regnat  annum'' ;  but  the 
burden  of  probability  is  against  him.  It  is  in  the 
last  degree  unlikely  that  the  whole  of  Spain  sur- 
rendered after  one  battle,  and  Isidore  is  quite 
ignorant  of  what  happened  in  the  North,  as  is 
proved  by  his  silence  about  Pelayo.  Rasis  lived 
too  long  after  the  events  he  narrates  to  be  reliable 
in  matters  of  detail,  but  the  escape  of  Roderick  in 
711  and  his  death  at  Segoyuela  two  years  later  bear 
the  stamp  of  truth  and  we  can  safely  follow  him  on 
this  particular  point. 

It  is  highly  improbable  that  the  cloud  which 
hangs  over  the  history  of  these  years  will  ever  be 
completely  dissipated,  but  research  has  already 
laid  bare  not  only  the  weakness  of  the  Visigothic 
monarchy  on  the  eve  of  its  overthrow  but  also  the 
fact  that  when  the  Arabs  landed  in  the  Peninsula 
either  in  the  course  of  a  raid  or  as  the  allies  of  some 
dynastic  faction  they  had  little  idea  that  they  were 
taking  a  step  which  was  to  carry  the  Crescent  to 
Tours  and  to  make  a  Moslem  Cordova  one  of  the 
wonders  of  the  World. 


xt 


Cf.  Arabic  Spain  supra. 


», 


'■f  "-^ 


t 
s 


*s 


12. 


18 


<^^ 


f  !<BK"-«J  K 


I  *^^^ 


THE    EVOLUTION    OE 

SPANISH  HISTORY 

(711-1833) 

IT  has  often  been  observed  that  one  great 
difference  between  Western  Europe  and  the 
rest  of  the  Old  World  is  that  in  the  former  the 
influence  of  the  past  does  not  pervade  the  present 
to  anything  like  the  same  extent  as  is  the  case  with 
the  latter.  It  may  be  that  England  and  France,  to 
quote  two  examples,  have  had  a  less  chequered 
national  career  than  many  of  the  states  to  the  South 
of  the  Danube,  for  instance,  and  consequently 
having  fewer  ancient  injuries  to  forgive  are  more 
ready  to  forgive  them  :  Ireland  is  the  exception 
which  seems  to  prove  the  rule.  Whatever  may  be 
the  reason  for  this  distinction  it  certainly  exists, 
and  has  to  be  taken  very  carefully  into  account 
when  dealing  with  the  problems  of  the  Balkans  and 
the  Near  East  :  Bulgar,  Serb,  and  Greek  lay  claim 
to  wide  territories  to  which  they  have  not  so  good 
a  title  as  King  George  V.  possesses  to  the  Duchies 
of  Normandy  and  Anjou.  In  Spain  the  influence 
of  the  past  does  not  flow  in  the  same  channels  as  in 
the  Balkan  Peninsula — unless  the  titles  of  its 
monarch  are  to  be  taken  literally  instead  of  being 
classed  with  the  claim  to  the  throne  of  France 
abandoned  by  George  III. — but  it  exists  to  a  much 
greater  degree  than  in  the  other  countries  of 
Western  Europe,  and  whereas  it  is  possible  to  argue 
that  some  such  date  as  1688,  1789,  or  1870  is  a 
watershed  in  the  history  of  England,  France,  or 
Germany,  that  of  Spain  is  one  continuous  whole 
from  the  arrival  of  Tarik,  if  not  from  that  of 
Hamilcar. 

14 


D 


<^ 


The  struggle  against  the  Moslem  lasted  for  over 
seven  centuries  and  has  contributed  more  than  any 
other  cause  to  the  formation  of  Spanish  national 
character  :    some  historians  have  compared  it  with 
the  Hundred  Years'  War  and  to  a  certain  extent 
the  analogy  is  good.     Both  contests — at  any  rate 
in  their  later  stages — assumed  a  national  character 
by   no   means  common   in  the   Middle   Ages,  and 
both  did  much  to  bring  about  the  political  unifica- 
tion of  the  two  countries,  but  here  the  comparison 
ends  :  not  only  did  the  struggle  in  the  Peninsula  last 
seven   times  as  long  as  that  which  the   House  of 
Valois  carried  on  with  its  English  neighbours,  but 
the   difference  between  Spaniard  and  Moor  went 
far  deeper  than  any  produced  by  a  mere  national 
contest — it  was  the  clash  between  two  opposing  and 
irreconcilable  civilizations,  a  phase  in  the  contest 
between   East  and  West  of  which   Marathon  was 
one  of   the   earliest   incidents   and   the   Treaty  of 
Sevres  one  of  the  latest.       England    and    France 
achieved  unity  largely  as  a  result  of  their  war  with 
one  another  but  their  national  character  was  formed 
later  and  under  the  influence  of   purely   domestic 
events,  while  in  Spain  the  character  of  both  people 
and  state  was  being  hammered  out  in  the  wars  of 
Alfonso  VI.   and   Ferdinand   III.       Attractive  as 
they  are  to  the  modern  student  the  glories  of  the 
Cordovan   Caliphate   are   merely   an    interlude   in 
Spanish  history— they  belong  to  the  annals  of  Islam 
and  not  to  those  of  Spain— and  the  development  of 
the    national    character    was    taking    place    in    the 
mountains  of  Asturias  rather  than  on  the  banks  of  the 
Guadalquiver.       Almost    alone    among    European 
nations  the  character  of  the  people  and  that  of  the 
state  were  formed  in  Spain  at  the  same  time  and  by 
the  same  events. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  feehng 
between  Christian  and  Moslem  had  always  been 
one  of  animosity  and,  indeed,  the  evidence  is  all 
to  the  contrarv,  for  it  is  known  that  intermarriage 
on  a  fairlv  extended  scale  took  place  even  in  the 

15 


''  ^   * 


ir 


11(11 


generation  immediately  following  the  overthrow 
of  the  Visigothic  monarchy  :  after  the  fall  of  the 
Ommeyad  dynasty  in  the  11th  century  the  relations 
between  the  two  races  gradually  underwent  a 
change,  and  this  was  particularly  the  case  when  the 
quarrel  was  no  longer  between  Arab  and  Spaniard, 
but  between  Crescent  and  Cross.  The  Arab 
element  in  the  Moslem  population  was  swamped  by 
the  Moorish  after  the  arrival  of  the  Almoravides 
and  the  Almohades,  while  Crusaders  from  all  parts 
of  Europe  fought  in  the  Christian  ranks  ;  the  nature 
of  the  struggle  changed  for  the  worse  and  became 
dominated  by  a  feeling  of  bitter  animosity,  while 
the  chivalrous  conduct  which  had  hitherto  marked 
the  contest  on  both  sides  became  noticeable  by  its 
absence.  This  metamorphosis  of  a  political  into  a 
religious  war  naturally  increased  the  power  of  the 
Church,  which  in  i'tS  turn  used  all  its  influence  to 
keep  alive  the  crusading  spirit.  When  the  conquest 
of  Granada  deprived  this  spirit  of  its  outlet  against 
the  Moslem,  the  Reformation  provided  it  with  a 
new  one,  and  the  Armada  of  Philip  II.  was  animated 
with  the  same  sentiment  as  that  which  had  inspired 
the  troops  of  Ferdinand  III.  The  idea  that  Spain 
was  the  chosen  instrument  of  God  for  the  chastise- 
ment of  Moslem  and  heretic  grew  up  so  rapidly 
during  the  reconquest  that  it  became  practically 
an  obsession,  and  it  was  not  until  both  monarchy 
and  nation  were  prostrate  with  exhaustion  in  the 
early  years  of  the  19th  century  that  the  crusading 
spirit  may  be  said  to  have  been  extinguished. 

The  union  of  the  crowns  of  Castile  and  Aragon 
opened  a  new  era,  since  Spain  no  longer  continued 
in  a  backwater  but  emerged  into  the  main  stream 
of  European  history  :  from  several  points  of  view 
this  was  a  mistake  as  the  country  had  so  many 
domestic  problems  to  settle  now  that  the  Peninsula 
—  with  the  exception  of  Portugal  and  Navarre  — 
was  united  and  the  Moor  w^as  expelled  that  a  period 
of  peace  was  necessary  if  a  satisfactory  solution  was 
to  be  found  ;  instead  of  this,  Ferdinand  and  Isabella 

16 


0 


& 


recast  in  spirit  if  not  in  form  nearly  every,  Spanish 
institution  under  a  pressure  which  was  rendered 
inevitable  by  the  exigencies  of  their  foreign  policy. 
It  may  be  argued  that  had  their  successors  been  as 
wise  as  themselves  they  w^ould  not  have  continued 
to  pursue  a  course,  which,  as  soon  became  clear, 
was  fraught  with  so  many  dangers,  but  it  must  also 
be  remembered  that  the  Catholic  Sovereigns  be- 
queathed not  only  their  home  policy  to  those  who 
reigned  after  them  but  also  their  foreign  commit- 
ments, and  thus  a  method  of  government  which  had 
been  instituted  under  the  stress  of  external  compli- 
cations continued  subject  to  the  same  handicap. 
The  policy  of  Ferdinand  and  Isabella  is  of  special 
importance  as  it  was  followed  in  detail  by  all  the 
monarchs  of  the  House  of  Austria  and  in  principle 
by  those  of  the  House  of  Bourbon  :  it  can  thus  claim 
a  longer  life  than  that  instituted  by  Richelieu  and 
carried  to  perfection  by  Louis  XIV.,  and  the  reason 
may  be  that  it  demanded  less  of  the  man,  being  a 
more  perfect  machine. 

The  domestic  policy  of  the  Catholic  Sovereigns 
has  been  very  aptly  compared  with  that  of  Augustus, 
and  it  is  certainly  true  that  in  both  cases  the  old 
forms  w^ere  preserved  while  the  substance  of  power 
passed  into  the  hands  of  the  monarch.  It  is  im- 
possible in  a  few  lines  to  describe  in  any  detail 
changes  which  modified  the  whole  spirit  of  the 
Spanish  state,  but  criticism  of  some  aspects  of  them 
is  essential  if  the  historical  development  of  Spain 
is  to  be  viewed  in  its  proper  perspective.  The  key- 
note of  the  new  regime  was  centralization,  and 
upon  this  naturally  followed  an  attempt  to  secure 
uniformitv  in  every  department  of  the  national 
life:  it  is  in  this  respect  that  the  change  is  most 
noticeable,  because  the  constitution  had  hitherto 
been,  as  in  England,  a  natural  growth,  but 
Ferdinand  and  Isabella  adopted  the  definite  policy 
of  strengthening  the  power  of  the  crown  ;  it  is  true 
that  the  monaichs  of  Castile  and  Aragon  had  for 
some  time  been  extending  their  influence  but  they 

17 


0' 


't 


111. . 


■MM 


had  lacked  either  the  will  or  the  ability  to  bend  the 
whole  system  of  government  to  this  one  end  :  out- 
wardly the  Castile  of  Isabella  I.  was  not  very 
different  to  the  Castile  of  Alfonso  VI.  but  the  spirit 
of  the  administration  was  in  marked  contrast  to  that 
of  the  earlier  period.  Under  the  later  monarchs 
of  the  House  of  Austria  and  in  the  18th  century 
centralization  became  excessive,  and  ruinous  as 
were  its  results  it  was  never  fatal  because  of  the 
local  patriotism  of  the  Spanish  people  ;  no  Jena 
would  have  made  Napoleon  master  of  Spain. 
When  the  central  government  broke  down  after 
the  abdication  of  the  House  of  Bourbon  at  Bayonne 
the  provinces  fought  for  themselves  in  a  way  that 
would  have  been  impossible  in  Prussia  or  Portugal. 
It  was  at  this  period,  too,  that  there  grew  up  that 
respect  for  the  person  of  the  monarch  upon  which 
«o  many  foreigners  remarked  during  the  17th  and 
18th  centuries,  and  its  strength  may  be  gauged  from 
the  fact  that  it  survived  even  the  reigns  of  Ferdinand 
VII.  and  Isabella  II.  and  was  readv  to  revive  in  its 
full  force  when  a  monarch  who  was  as  worthy  of  it 
as  any  of  his  predecessors  ascended  the  throne  in 
the  person  of  Alfonso  XII. 

More  misconceptions  have  probably  arisen  with 
regard  to  the  decline  of  the  Cortes  than  about  any 
other  subject  in  Spanish  history,  and  the  rising  of 
the  Communeros  has  been  represented  as  a  protest 
against  autocracy  while  it  was  in  reality  a  protest 
against  order.  There  never  was  one  Cortes  for  the 
whole  of  Spain  until  the  beginning  of  last  century, 
since  the  union  of  Aragon  and  Castile  did  not  result 
in  the  creation  of  one  assembly  as  that  of  Castile 
and  Leon  had  done  several  centuries  earlier.  As 
the  nobility  and  clergy  were  exempt  from  taxation 
the  Cortes  in  practice  was  confined  to  the  Third 
Estate,  and  in  Castile  so  great  was  the  indifference 
in  political  matters  that  representation  became 
limited  to  eighteen  cities,  whose  nominees  were 
easily  cajoled  or  intimidated  by  the  government 
into  granting  the  sum  required  :    the  necessity  of 

18 


V. 


'   -¥ 


their  consent  to  the  making  of  laws  was  never 
claimed.  Everywhere  the  old  mediaeval  assemblies 
were  falling  into  abeyance,  and  there  is  much  to 
be  said  for  the  theory  that  Pariiament  only  con- 
tinued to  exist  in  England  because  of  the  doubtful 
title  of  the  House  of  Tudor  and  the  desire  of  Henry 
VIII.  to  secure  popular  support  for  his  attitude 
towards  the  Pope.  There  is  no  need  to  regret  the 
passing  of  the  Cortes  in  Castile  and  Aragon  ;  in  the 
days  of  its  power  it  had  shown  itself  in  both  king- 
doms short-sighted  and  factious,  and  there  is  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  had  it  been  consulted  it 
would  have  opposed  the  two  most  fatal  measures 
of  the  government — the  expulsion  of  the  Jews  and 
that  of  the  Moriscoes.  The  place  of  the  Cortes 
was  usurped  by  the  Councils,  which  were  also  so 
predominant  a  feature  of  Tudor  administration,  and 
St  was  in  their  lack  of  knowledge  of  local  conditions 
that  the  weakness  of  the  whole  structure  lay,  for  the 
tax  upon  all  articles  bought  or  sold  did  more  to  ruin 
Spain  than  any  other  point  in  the  domestic  policy 
of  the  Catholic  Sovereigns.  The  sin  of  the  House 
of  Austria  was  not  its  autocracy,  but  under  the 
earlier  monarchs  its  short-sightedness  and  under 
the  later  ones  its  inefficiency. 

If  the  domestic  policy  inaugurated  by  Ferdinand 
and  Isabella  more  nearly  approximated  to  that 
which  had  hitherto  been  pursued  in  Castile  than  to 
that  which  had  characterized  the  government  of 
Aragon — and  such  was  the  case, — their  attitude  to- 
wards their  neighbours  was  inspired  wholly  by 
Aragonese  traditions.  Castile  had  always  been 
friendly  towards  France,  and  indeed  the  House  of 
Trastamara  had  obtained  the  throne  largely  by 
French  help  ;  but  Aragon  had  followed  a  different 
policy,  and  her  quarrel  with  the  Angevin  monarchs 
of  Naples  and  her  intrigues  in  Navarre  brought 
about  a  definite  feeling  of  hostility  between  France 
and  herself.  By  the  close  of  the  15th  century  the 
contest  between  the  House  of  Aragon  and  that  of 
Anjou  for  the  possession  of  South  Italy  had  assumed 

19 


***?a^f«*^  *,hWj«si*,«  ?ii'af?*w  n 


the  form  of  a  war  between  France  and  Spain  for  the 
domination  of  Europe,  and  in  this  struggle  the  latter 
country  had  no  real  interest  :  step  by  step  Spairt 
became  embroiled  in  disputes  which  in  no  way 
aflfected  her,  while  the  real  field  of  expansion  in- 
North  Africa  was  neglected  save  for  spasmodic 
and  ineffective  expeditions.  The  accession  of 
Charles  at  such  a  moment  was  fatal,  for  whatever 
may  have  been  his  merits  as  a  Holy  Roman 
Emperor  he  was  a  complete  failure  as  King  of 
Spain  :  he  took  as  little  interest  in  the  Peninsula  as^ 
his  father,  Philip  I.  had  done,  and  he  regarded  it 
merely  as  an  inexhaustible  mine  of  men  and  money 
to  provide  him  with  recruits  and  supplies  where- 
with to  advance  the  purely  dynastic  interests  of  the 
Hapsburg  family.  If  Ferdinand  had  wasted  the 
resources  of  Spain  in  Italy,  Charles  nearly 
exhausted  them  by  his  participation  in  every  war 
in  Europe  :  not  content  wnth  the  blows  he  had 
inflicted  upon  Spain  during  his  life  he  committed 
the  unpardonable  crime  of  including  the  Nether- 
lands in  the  Spanish  dominions  at  his  death,  thus 
leaving  to  his  successor  an  almost  impossible  task. 
Philip  II.  was  called  upon  to  meet  the  liabilities 
which  the  policy  of  his  predecessors  had  created, 
and  they  were  of  four  kinds  :  the  Italian  connection 
had  led  to  hostilities  both  with  the  Sultan  and  with 
the  Pope,  but  the  Battle  of  Lepanto  in  the  one  case 
and  a  combination  of  firmness  and  moderation  in 
the  other  effectively  secured  the  safety  of  the 
Spanish  dominions  in  this  quarter ;  the  acquisition 
of  the  Netherlands  had  entangled  Spain  in  the 
struggle  against  the  Reformation,  and  in  this 
respect  Philip  was  only  successful  in  retaining 
Belgium  since  by  the  year  of  his  death  he  had  lost 
-the  hold  upon  England,  Holland,  and  France  w^hich 
he  had  at  one  time  possessed  either  wholly  or  in 
part ;  more  serious  in  the  end  than  either  of  these 
liabilities  was  that  incurred  by  the  possession  of 
America,  for  it  entailed  perpetual  war  with  England 
and  practically  cut  off  all  communication  with  the 


20 


Netherlands  by  sea,  while  an  attempt  to  retrieve 
the  situation  in  1588  had  led  to  the  loss  of  the  com- 
mand of  that  element ;  at  home  Philip  completed 
ithe  unification  of  the  Peninsula  by  the  conquest  of 
Portugal  but  he  was  too  busy  elsewhere  to  take  any 
steps  to  remedy  the  economic  and  social  decay  of 
Jiis  dominions. 

It  is  customary  for  historians  to  lay  the  blame 
ior  the  downfall  of  Spain  at  the  door  of  Philip  II:, 
l^ut  in  reality  he  in  no  way  deserves  it  :  he  certainly 
was  not  a  great  man  when  compared  with  some  of 
his  contemporaries  and  he  was  also  extremely 
narrow-minded  in  that  he  could  see  no  point  of 
view  other  than  his  own,  but  he  unflinchingly  faced 
a  situation  which  had  been  imposed  upon  him  and 
which  would  have  made  many  a  stronger  man 
despair.  In  his  foreign  policy  he  was  not  so  un- 
successful as  may  at  first  sight  appear ;  he  secured 
the  Spanish  possessions  from  attack  in  the  East,  he 
'saved  part  of  the  Netherlands  when  at  one  time  all 
of  them  seemed  lost,  and  he  had  every  reason  to 
hope  that  the  death  of  Elizabeth  would  mean  the* 
-cessation  of  English  raids  in  American  waters,  while 
by  the  annexation  of  Portugal  he  was  merdy  carry- 
ing the  domestic  policy  of  Ferdinand  and  Isabella 
to  its  logical  conclusions.  His  masterful  diplomacy 
in  the  early  years  of  his  reign  when  faced  by  the' 
Stuart-Valois  combination  proves  Philip  to  have 
been  a  man  of  no  ordinary  political  skill,  and  what- 
ever his  faults  he  was  a  thorough  Spaniard  in  a  way 
in  which  his  father  had  never  been.  It  is  not  too 
much  to  say  that  had  Philip's  successors  possessed 
even  a  small  part  of  his  ability  the  17th  century 
would  not  have  been  so  disastrous  in  the  annals  of 
his  country. 

The  hundred  years  which  elapsed  between  the 
death  of  Philip  II.  and  the  extinction  of  the  male 
line  of  the  Spanish  Hapsburgs  constituted  so  far  as 
Spain  was  concerned  a 'period  of  great  events  and 
little  men  :  how  small  the  latter  were  can  be  seen 
in  almost  every  canvas  of  Velasquez.     The  three 

21 


J- 


I 


M 


monarchs  who  occupied  the  throne  during  this  time 
were  of  very  mediocre  intellect,  and  Charles  II. 
was  little  better  than  an  idiot :  Olivares  alone^ 
attracts  attention  for  his  ability,  and  he  could  do 
little  more  than  postpone  the  day  of  reckoning. 
After  the  continual  wars  of  the  16th  century  the 
one  thing  Spain  needed  above  everything  else  was 
a  long  period  of  peace,  and  had  this  been  granted 
to  her  and  combined  with  some  attempt  at  internal 
reform  the  genius  of  her  population  would  probably^ 
have  enabled  her  to  recover  before  it  was  too  late  : 
instead  of  this,  Philip  III.  completed  the  economic 
ruin  of  his  country  by  the  expulsion  of  the 
Moriscoes  while  his  successor  piled  Pelion  on  Ossa 
by  embroiling  Spain  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War. 
This  contest  in  no  way  affected  Spanish  interests 
and  victory  could  only  benefit  the  Austrian  Haps- 
burgs,  but  for  a  time  it  sounded  the  death-knell  of 
Spanish  greatness.  The  middle  of  the  century  was 
an  era  of  disorder  all  over  Europe  and  nowhere 
was  this  more  marked  than  in  the  Peninsula  : 
Portugal  declared  her  independence  under  the 
House  of  Braganza  and  Spain  was  too  feeble  to 
re-assert  her  authority  ;  in  Andalucia,  the  Basque 
Provinces,  and  Catalonia  there  were  risings  which 
showed  a  separatist  spirit  wholly  incompatible  with 
Castilian  centralization  ;  while  in  Naples  there  was 
a  popular  revolt  against  Spanish  rule.  Abroad  an 
even  more  serious  disaster  had  taken  place  at 
Rocroy  where  the  military  supremacy  of  Europe 
definitely  passed  from  Spain  to  France.  Still 
Olivares  had  struggled  to  preserve  an  appearance 
of  strength  and  he  had  been  so  successful  that  when 
Oliver  Cromwell  was  called  upon  to  make  his  choice 
of  allies  in  the  Franco-Spanish  struggle  he  chose 
France  as  being  the  weaker  of  the  two.  After  the 
Treaty  of  the  Pyrenees  (1659),  however,  the  de- 
cadence of  Spain  could  no  longer  be  concealed  and 
the  reign  of  Charles  II.  is  the  record  of  the  cession 
of  its  most  coveted  possessions  to  Louis  XIV.  At 
length  the  rest  of  Europe  became  alarmed  at  this 

22 


I 


accession  of  strength  to  France,  and  the  century 
ended  with  a  Coalition  of  European  powers  fighting 
in  defence  of  a  country  against  whom  they  had  all 
been  arrayed  at  its  commencement.  Spain  herself 
counted  for  nothing  :  her  navy  did  not  exist,  and 
her  soldiers  begged  for  alms  in  the  towns  they  were 
supposed  to  garrison  :  she  was  in  the  same  position 
as  the  Ottoman  Empire  two  centuries  later  and  was 
only  saved  from  destruction  by  the  divisions  of  her 
enemies  :  yet  Spain  was  not  wholly  decadent  for  it 
was  the  age  of  Velasquez  and  Calderon. 

The  change  from  Hapsburg  to  Bourbon  was  in 
every  respect  a  happy  one  :  the  new  dynasty  be- 
came Spanish  in  a  way  in  which  its  predecessor  had 
never  done,  and  even  the  connection  with  France 
was  in  many  ways  preferable  to  the  old  one  with 
Austria,  for  Vienna  was  alreadv  on  the  road  to 
Sadowa  while  France  even  in  the  days  of  Louis  XV. 
possessed  a  resilience  impossible  in  the  polyglot 
dominions  of  the  Hapsburgs.  The  loss  of  Italy  had 
at  last  wiped  away  the  evil  consequences  of  the 
foreign  policy  of  Aragon,  and  it  was  regretted  in 
Spain  only  by  those  classes  which  filled  the  official 
posts  in  the  Italian  provinces  :  in  Italy  itself  Spanish 
rule  was  remembered  with  regret  after  a  few  years 
of  Austrian  domination.  The  Netherlands  were 
an  evil  legacy  from  Charles  I.  and  their  final  sever- 
ance from  the  Spanish  crown  was  an  inestimable 
benefit.  Only  the  loss  of  Gibraltar  offended  the 
national  pride,  and  thereby  led  to  several  disastrous 
wars.  At  home  the  introduction  of  French 
methods  of  government  brought  about  a  great  in- 
crease in  administrative  efficiency,  as  was  shown 
by  the  striking  revival  of  Spanish  power  under  the 
guidance  of  Alberoni.  The  councils,  which  had  been 
so  prominent  a  feature  of  the  work  of  Ferdinand 
and  Isabella  had  reached  such  a  state  of  decrepitude 
as  to  render  them  perfectly  useless  for  the  trans- 
action of  any  urgent  business,  gave  way  to  a  cabinet 
of  ministers.  The  monarchy  became  more  absolute 
than  had  been  the  case  under  the  House  of  Austria, 

38 


■     7f 


>     .1 


f    M'"^ 


»-*p5V  ">- 


and  this  chiefly  in  two  ways  :  the  power  of  the 
nobility  was  greatly  weakened  as  many  of  its  leaders 
were  in  exile  owing  to  their  support  of  Charles  VI:, 
while  Philip  V.  abolished  the  ''\fueros"  of  the 
Kingdom  of  Aragon  on  the  plea  that  'it  had 
supported  his  rival  :  the  insignificance  of  the 
Cortes  can  be  gauged  by  the  fact  that  it  was  never 
summoned  to  confirm  the  will  of  Charles  II.  With 
these  exceptions  the  new  dynasty  made  little  altera- 
tion in  the  time-honoured  traditions  of  Spain;  but 
its  mere  advent  brought  the  country  more  into  touch 
with  the  rest  of  Europe  and  the  effect  of  this  can 
be  judged  by  the  relative  position  of  Spain  and 
Portugal  in  the  17th  and  18th  centuries — in  the 
former  there  was  little  difference  in  their  internal 
condition,  in  the  latter  Spain  was  far  ahead  of  her 
neighbour. 

Unfortunately  the  advantages  which  were 
eventually  to  accrue  from  the  change  of  dynasty 
were  not  at  first  apparent  owing  to  the  influence  of 
Elizabeth  Farnese,  the  second  wife  of  Philip  V. 
This  extraordinary  w^oman  desired  to  recover  the 
possessions  in  Italy  which  Spain  had  lost  at  Utrecht 
and  to  divide  them  among  her  sons,  for  she  feared 
that  both  their  position  and  her  own  would  become 
exceedingly  insecure  when  her  step-son,  Ferdinand, 
ascended  the  throne  ;  in  fact  she  desired  Naples 
and  Parma  as  a  dower-house  for  herself  after  her 
husband's  death.  As  this  policy  was  essentially 
dynastic  and  not  national  it  is  not  surprising  that  it 
was  carried  out  by  the  agertcy  of  foreigners  such 
as  Alberoni  and  Ripperda,  and  indeed  during  the 
whole  of  the  reign  of  Philip  V.  foreign  and  particu- 
larly Italian  influence  at  Madrid  was  very  marked. 
Opposed  to  this  purely  dynastic  policy  were  those 
who  urged  that  the  right  course  for  Spain  to  pursue 
was  to  develop  her  possessions  in  America  and  to 
maintain  a  strict  neutrality  in  all  European  struggles. 
It  is  the  vacillation  of  Philip  between  these  two 
policies  which  explains  many  of  the  difficulties 
encountered  in  understanding  Spanish  history  in  the 

24 


T 


i 


e-  f  A 


early  18th  century.  In  both' cases  there  was  the 
threat  of  war ;  if  the  views  of  Elizabeth  prevailed 
there  was  a  casus  belli  for  Austria  who  desired  to 
retain  Italy  under  her  own  control,  while  if  the* 
policy  of  her  opponents  were  adopted  hostilities 
with  England  were  certain.  In  addition  there  was" 
the  close  relationship  between  the  Kings  of  France 
and  Spain — later  to  be  rendered  even  more  binding 
by  the  Family  Compact — to  be  taken  into  account, 
and  after  Louis  XV.  had  attained  his  majority  his 
uncle  was  always  susceptible  to  any  appeal  of  a 
purdy  dynastic  nature  :  while  the  French  King  was 
still  in  his  infancy  Philip  had  never  regarded  his 
residence  in  Spain  as  more  than  temporary  and 
had  lived  in  hourly  hope  of  being  summoned  to 
mount  the  throne  of  St.  Louis.  In  spite  of  these 
differences  the  reign  of  Philip  V.  was  not  inglorious 
for  Spain  ;  if  the  acquisition  of  Naples  and  Parma 
was  of  little  benefit  to  the  country  as  a  whole,  the 
wars  which  took  place  to  secure  them  demonstrated 
to  Europe  that  the  evil  days  of  Charles  II.  were 
things  of  the  past,  while  the  severe  check  inflicted 
upon  England  at  Cartagena  proved  that  the  Spanish 
possessions  in  America  were  not  as  vulnerable  as 
the  exploits  of  the  17th  century  Buccaneers  might 
have  led  men  to  suppose.  Internally  the  progress 
made  was  remarkable,  and  if  no  special  innovations 
w^ere  introduced  the  old  machinery  everywhere 
worked  more  smoothly,  while  the  improvement  in 
the  army  and  navy  is  witnessed  by  all  con- 
temporaries. 

The  purely  pacific  policy  of  Ferdinand  VI.  gave 
Spain  a  period  of  repose  to  which  she  had  been  a 
stranger  for  centuries  and  prepared  her  for  the 
reforms  of  his  brother.  Charles  III.  ranks  with 
Frederick  11.  of  Prussia  as  the  most  practical  of 
the  benevolent  Despots  but  little  of  his  work 
survived  the  reign  of  his  son  :  roads,  bridges,  and 
canals  were  allowed  to  fall  into  decay  and  soon 
became  useless,  while  the  enlightened  spirit  which 
he  endeavoured  to  breathe  into  the  national  institu- 


25 


} 

# 


'«•■'  If, 


,'21 


■,I'M 


'^i 


tions  was  powerless  against  the  frenzy  of  reaction 
caused  by  the  excesses  of  the  French  Revolution  : 
a    small    class    only    became    inspired    with    the 
principles  of  liberalism,  and  they  were  of  a  doctrin- 
aire nature  not  only  utterly  alien  to  the  character 
of  Charles  III.  but  also  quite  useless  in  the  sphere 
of    practical    politics ;   unfortunately    these    people 
had    learnt    nothing    by    experience    when    events, 
threw  the  government  of  Spain  into  their  hands  in 
the  following  century.     Abroad  Charles  pursued  a 
commercial  and  national  policy,  but  the  dynastic 
interests  of  the  House  of  Bourbon  induced  him  to* 
participate  in  the  Seven  Years'  War,  and  Spain  had 
to  pay  dearly  for  his  mistake.   Conflict  with  England 
was  inevitable  if  her  aggressions  in  America  were 
to     be     prevented     and     Charles     realized     this : 
extensive  preparations  were  made  for  a  number  of 
years  and  when  the  War  of  American  Independence 
began    the    Spanish    government    joined    that    of 
France  in  support  of  the  revolted  colonists.    Except 
for  the  failure  to  reduce  Gibraltar  the  war  which 
followed  was  eminently  successful,   and   the  gains 
which  were  made  by  Spain  were  secured  to  her  by 
the  Treaty  of  Versailles.      Charles  did  not  live  ta 
see   the   evil   effects  of   supporting   the   American 
rebels  of  George  III.  but  there  can  be  little  doubt 
that  it  was  the  example  which  they  set  that  was 
followed   in   Spanish   America   a   generation   later. 
Charles  III.  loomed  larger  in  the  eyes  of  his  con- 
temporaries than  he  has  done  in  those  of  posterity  : 
his  reign  was  too  brief  to  allow  his  reforms  to  be 
permanently  accepted  and  his  successor  was  too- 
feeble  to  carry  out  his  policy  even  if  the  French 
Revolution   had   not   made   it   dangerous   to   dally 
with    liberalism ;    yet    Charles    fully    realized    the 
resources  of  his  country  and  if  he  achieved  little  of 
permanent  value  he  pointed  out  the  road  for  others 
to  tread.     He  was  certainly  the  greatest  monarch 
that  united  Spain  had  yet  produced. 

Charles  IV.  was  a  weak  if  not  a  vicious  man, 
and  he  had  the  misfortune  to  ascend  the  throne  at 


■^ 


t^ 


a  time  when  only  statesmanship  of  a  very  high  order 
could  have  steered  his  country  safely  through  the 
dangers  which  surrounded  her  :  he  was  completely 
under  the  influence  of  his  wife  whose  passion  for 
Godoy  made  the  latter  the  real  ruler  of  Spain.  The 
outbreak  of  the  French  Revolution  created  such  a 
panic  that  the  liberal  measures  of  the  preceding 
generation  were  at  once  abandoned,  and  as  no 
effort  was  made  to  substitute  any  new  system  in 
their  place  chaos  rapidly  ensued  :  the  army  and 
navy,  which  had  been  so  successful  in  the  War  of 
American  Independence,  were  allowed  to  decay 
and  were  consequently  useless  when  required  for 
active  service.  Above  all  no  attempt  was  made  to 
work  out  a  foreign  policy  suitable  to  the  changed 
political  conditions  of  Europe  :  Spain  was  too  weak 
to  stand  alone,  and  to  continue  her  alliance  with 
France  was  at  once  opposed  to  her  interests  and  to 
her  principles;  she  must,  temporarily  at  any  rate, 
throw  in  her  lot  with  the  Coalition,  and  as  it  was 
largely  composed  of  those  who  had  been  her 
enemies  up  to  a  very  recent  date  her  relations  with 
these  new  allies  would  require  extremely  careful 
adjustment.  Godoy,  however,  cared  for  none  of 
these  things  :  his  only  wish  was  to  retain  his  own 
position  and  if  he  could  make  the  troubled  condition 
of  Europe  suit  his  ends  so  much  the  better ;  but 
he  had  to  proceed  warily  for  he  was  hated  by  many 
of  his  countrymen  and  he  was  faced  at  almost  every 
turn  by  the  opposition  of  the  Prince  of  Asturias. 
The  vacillations  of  Spanish  policy  during  these 
critical  years  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  they 
were  dictated  by  the  favourite's  determination  to  re- 
tain power  at  all  costs,  and  as  it  suited  his  ambitions 
Spain  was  made  to  play  the  part  of  the  champion  of 
the  monarchial  principle  or  that  of  the  only  friend 
of  Napoleon.  No  nation  in  Europe  changed  front 
so  completely  and  so  often  during  these  momentous 
years  except  possibly  Prussia,  and  she  suffered  the 
same  fate  in  the  end.  When  the  final  blow  came 
and  Napoleon  determined  to  abolish  the  Pyrenees 

27 


'f.' 


,^.  iJ.- 

3'  ^^' 


-^^ 


i- 


'W'^ 
l'''^*! 


i|^,t^i*-T  jwS*^  )7 


^s  Louis  XIV.  had  done  Spain  hard  neither  strength 
to  Resist  nor  allies  to  help  her,  for  the  policy  of 
Godoy  had  merely  emboldened  her  enemies  and 
alrenated  her  friends.  For  centuries  Spain  had 
sacrificed  everything  to  Church  and  King  but' 
neither  saved  her  in  the  hour  of  need  :  the  former 
was  sunk  in  the  torpor  common  to  all  eccelsiastical 
establishments  in  the  18th  century,  while  the  latter 
dimmed  for  two  generations  the  lustre  of  the  crown 
in  the  ignominious  proceedings  at  Bayonne. 

The  events  of  the  year  1808  proved  to  be  of  vital 
importance  in  the  evolution  of  the  history  of  Spain 
but  they  in  no  way  represented  a  break  in  its 
continuity.  The  Peninsular  War  once  more  brought 
the  country  into  contact  with  Western  Europe  and 
thus  was  rather  the  cause  of  a  revival  than  of  an 
interruption  in  the  national  life.  If  Spanish  history 
after  that  struggle  seems  widely  different  to  what  it 
had  been  during  the  18th  century  the  reason  must 
be  sought  in  the  isolated  position  of  the  country 
prior  to  the  invasion  of  the  French  :  in  Germany, 
Italy,  and  the  Low  Countries  revolutionary  ideas 
had  gained  a  footing  even  before  they  had  attained 
to  supremacy  in  France  so  that  the  ground  was 
already  well  prepared  :  in  Spain,  on  the  other  hand, 
nothing  had  occurred  to  rouse  the  country  from  its 
long  sleep  s6  that  when  the  storm  burst  it  did  so 
with  redoubled  violence.  Yet  the  results  of  the  six 
years  of  war  were  to  bring  out  the  sterling  qualities 
of  the  Spaniard  and  even  the  turmoil  of  the  19th 
century  was  largely  only  the  concomitant  of  a 
national  renaissance,  infinitely  preferable  to  the 
placidity  of  decay  which  had  marked  its  prede- 
cessor. The  captivity  of  Ferdinand  and  the 
inability  of  the  governing  class  to  cope  with  the 
difficulties  which  appeared  in  every  quarter  made 
it  impossible  to  conduct  the  struggle  against 
Napoleon  by  the  bid  methods,  and  the  new  ideas 
whicbwere  engendered  by  the  heat  of  the  struggle 
were  not  likely  to  be  completely  abandoned  when 
the    French    were    driven    across    the    Pyrenees. 

2(i 


\K 


C 


>   A 


Two  facts  emerged  most  clearly  from  the  welter  of 
these  terrible  years — that  the  royal  authority  was 
not  a  sine  qua  non  of  the  national  existence,  and 
that  the  Liberals  were  almost  entirely  visionaries 
and  theorists.  The  central  power  armed  with  the 
name  of  Ferdinand  had  done  little  to  bring  the  war 
to  a  victorious  conclusion,  while  the  reformers  had 
been  more  intent  upon  devising  constitutions  than 
upon  providing  munitions.  That  the  angien 
regime  could  not  permanently  be  restored  in  its 
entirety  was  obvious  to  all  save  those  whose  pre- 
judice obscured  their  reason,  but  it  was  still  doubt- 
ful to  what  extent  new  methods  of  government 
should  be  introduced  and  in  what  manner  the  new 
ideas  were  to  be  adjusted  to  the  ancient  polity. 
These  were  the  questions  which  it  took  two  genera- 
tions to  decide. 

Of  all  the  tragic  blunders  committed  in  1808 
perhaps  the  most  important  in  its  ultimate  conse- 
quences was  the  mistake  which  Ferdinand  made  in 
placing  himself  in  the  power  of  Napoleon  instead 
of  withdrawing  into  Andalucia  and  putting  himself 
at  the  head  of  the  popular  movement  :  had  he 
adopted  this  course  the  royal  authority  would  not 
have  received  the  blows  which  it  was  destined  to 
suffer  during  the  next  six  years  and  the  effect  upon 
the  history  of  Spain  in  the  19th  century  had 
Ferdinand  anticipated  the  patriotism  of  Albert  of 
Belgium  is  an  interesting,  if  somewhat  futile, 
speculation.  The  desperate  nature  of  the  struggle 
which  began  on  the  2nd  of  May,  1808,  has  often 
obscured  the  fact  that  Spain  was  not  unanimously 
in  arms  on  behalf  of  the  absent  Ferdinand  :  it  is 
true  that  there  were  few  who  desired  the  restora- 
tion of  Charles  IV.,  but  among  the  educated  classes 
Napoleon  did  not  fail  to  make  some  converts  to  the 
idea  of  substituting  for  the  House  of  Bourbon  a 
Bonaparte  dynasty  in  the  person  of  Joseph.  The 
French  Em.peror  endeavoured  to  cover  his  acts 
with  a  cloak  of  legality  by  convening  at  Bayonne  a 
meeting  of  Spanish  notables  which  received  at  his 

.  29 


M 


.^. 


»'    Si 


a 


hands  a  constitution  on  the  French  model,  while 
Ferdinand  sank  so  low  as  to  oflEer  his  congratulations 
to  his  supplanter.  Napoleon's  clemency  was  use- 
less. In  spite  of  the  fact  that  Joseph  was  infinitely 
superior  to  Ferdinand  both  as  a  man  and  as  a 
monarch,  and  that  the  new  constitution  was  far  in 
advance  of  anything  that  Spain  had  hitherto 
possessed  the  country  would  tolerate  neither  the 
new  king  nor  his  methods.  It  soon  became  obvious 
that  a  new  phenomenon  was  being  witnessed  in  the 
shape  of  a  popular  rising,  and  although  the  French 
armies  easily  overcame  all  organized  resistance 
the  methods  which  had  been  successful  in  Prussia 
were  quite  ineffective.  The  provinces  fought  for 
themselves,  and  although  the  struggle  was  every- 
where carried  on  in  the  name  of  the  absent 
Ferdinand  the  leaders  in  the  field  took  little  notice 
of  any  central  authority.  Those  Spaniards  who 
were  prepared  to  acquiesce  in  the  change  of 
dynasty  were  held  up  to  the  universal  execration 
of  their  fellow-countrymen  under  the  title  of  **los 
afrancesados,''  while  the  notables  who  had  refused 
Napoleon's  invitation  to  Bayonne  became  at  once 
the  objects  of  popular  adoration.  The  details  of 
the  campaigns  of  the  Peninsular  War  more  vitally 
affect  European  than  Spanish  history,  and  it  is  the 
political  changes  to  which  they  gave  rise  that  so 
greatly  affected  the  future. 

For  so  long  had  the  whole  administration  of  the 
government  been  centred  in  the  monarch  that  when 
he  was  removed  no  one  knew  who  was  to  exercise 
authority  in  his  place  :  the  Council  of  Castile  made 
a  hesitating  attempt  to  secure  the  reins  of  power  but 
it  was  too  uncertain  of  its  position,  and  some  of  its 
members  were  too  strongly  suspected  of  sympathy 
with  the  invader  for  the  effort  to  be  successful. 
Meanwhile  Juntas  sprang  up  all  over  Spain  as  the 
struggle  against  the  French  proceeded  and  they 
all  owed  a  more  or  less  nominal  allegiance  to  a 
Central  Junta  which  changed  its  place  of  residence 
in  accordance  with  the  vicissitudes  of  the  military 

30 


\\ 


situation  ;  this  body  was  intensely  loyal  to  Ferdinand 
and  all  business  was  transacted  in  his  name  :  it  is 
also  interesting  to  note  that  the  colonies  were  asked 
to  send  delegates.  In  1810  the  Central  Junta 
repaired  to  Cadiz,  which  at  that  time  was  one  of  the 
r  few  towns  still  in  the  hands  of  the  patriots,  and 
resigned  its  power  to  a  Council  of  Regency,  but 
before  doing  so  it  convoked  a  Cortes  of  all  Spain 
in  two  houses,  which  was  subsequently  altered  to  a 
single  chamber.  This  was  a  purely  revolutionary 
measure  since  no  such  body  was  known  to  the 
constitution  :  the  union  of  the  crowns  of  Aragon 
and  Castile  had  not  been  followed  by  the  formation 
of  a  single  Cortes  as  had  been  the  case  when  Leon 
and  Castile  became  united,  and  if  the  Cortes  of 
Aragon  had  been  almost  forgotten  during  the  18th 
century  it  was  due  to  the  measures  of  Philip  V. 
^  which  have  already  been  mentioned.  The  assembly 
met  in  September,  1810,  and  it  at  once  became 
evident  that  two  parties  were  struggling  for 
mastery  :  on  the  one  side  there  were  those  who 
realized  how  little  Spain  desired  representative 
government  and  how  angry  Ferdinand  would  be  at 
such  a  step  having  been  taken  in  his  absence,  while 
on  the  other  were  the  men  who  were  infected  with 
the  ideas  to  which  the  French  Revolution  had  given 
birth  and  were  determined  to  take  advantage  of 
the  suspension  of  all  regular  government  to  put 
them  into  practice.  The  strength  of  this  latter 
faction  lay  in  the  sea-ports  which  have  always  been 
the  home  of  Radicalism,  and  as  the  coast-towns 
were  at  that  date  almost  the  only  part  of  Spain  able 
to  send  representatives  to  the  Cortes  it  is  not  sur- 
prising that  the  extremists  had  a  majority  in  that 
body.  The  Council  of  Regency  soon  found  itself 
unable  to  work  with  the  new  masters  of  Spain  and 
resigned,  only  to  be  succeeded  by  another  more  in 
harmony  with  the  views  of  the  majority  o£  the 
deputies.  At  length,  in  1812,  the  Cortes  completed 
V§f'  the  work  upon  which  it  had  been  engaged — to  the 
almost  complete  neglect  of  the  conduct  of  the  war 


^  |> 


-si        ^   I 


31 


against  Napoleon — and  promulgated  the  memor- 
able Constitution  which  has  since  become  famous 
as  that  of  1812. 

The  main  points  of  this  extraordinary  document 
were  that  Spain  was  to  be  governed  by  a  moderate 
hereditary  monarchy  with  the  right  of  making  laws 
vested  in  the  crown  and  one  chamber ;  for  the 
election  of  the  latter  all  males  over  the  age  of 
twenty-five  were  to  posses  the  franchise  but  the 
actual  selection  of  the  deputies  was  indirect  and 
involved  four  separate  processes.  Whether  this 
constitution  would  have  worked  in  a  country  which 
had  been  accustomed  to  representative  government 
for  several  centuries  is  a  moot  point,  but  that  it  was 
totally  unsuited  to  Spain  at  the  beginning  of  the 
19th  century  cannot  be  for  a  moment  in  doubt :  it 
placed  in  a  subordinate  position  both  the  King 
and  the  Church,  and  yet  these  were  the  only  two 
institutions  which  the  country  had  known  since  the 
days  of  Ferdinand  and  Isabella.  More  important 
than  the  actual  details  of  the  Constitution  of  1812 — 
for  it  proved  quite  useless  when  put  into  practice — 
is  the  influence  which  it  came  to  wield  in  the  politics 
of  Southern  Europe  :  for  nearly  a  generation  after 
the  fall  of  Napoleon  every  popular  rising  not  only 
in  Spain  itself  but  in  Portugal,  Piedmont,  and 
Naples,  demanded  the  immediate  enactment  of  the 
Constitution  of  1812  and  it  was  not  until  the  rise  of 
began  to  pass  into  oblivion  :  this  curious  situation 
^;^epublicanism  in  the  middle  of  the  century  that  it 
"^an  only  be  compared — and  the  parallel  is  by  no 
means  exact — with  the  distorted  vision  of  Magna 
Carta  possessed  by  the  opponents  of  Charles  I. 
and  the  use  they  made  as  a  war-cry  of  the  provisions 
of  that  somewhat  ambiguous  document. 

It  soon  became  apparent  that  the  opponents  of 
this  measure  had  gauged  the  feelings  of  their  fellow- 
countrymen  more  accurately  than  those  who 
supported  it,  for  as  the  provinces  were  liberated 
from  the  French  and  their  deputies  began  to  attend 
the  Cortes  the  Liberal  majority  rapidly  sank,  while 

82 


" 


<•/ 


the  members  of  that  party  became  more  violent  in 
their  demands  when  they  realized  that  power  was 
passing  from  them.  Such  was  the  situation  when 
the  Constituent  Cortes  was  dissolved  and  a  new 
Cortes  was  elected  in  October,  1813 ;  the  most 
desperate  efforts  of  the  Liberals  had  only  secured 
them  a  very  narrow  majority  in  the  new  house  and 
they  were  at  once  faced  with  the  prospect  of 
Ferdinand*s  immediate  return  from  exile.  In  vain 
they  attempted  to  regulate  his  movements  and  to 
compel  him  to  take  an  oath  to  observe  the  Con- 
stitution of  1812  :  Ferdinand  temporized  until  he 
had  ascertained  for  himself  the  state  of  public 
opinion,  but  his  journey  through  Catalonia  in  March 
was  so  triumphal  a  progress  that  he  realized  there 
was  no  need  for  further  procrastination  and  at 
Valencia  on  the  4th  May,  1814,  he  condemned  the 
Consititution  of  1812  and  restored  the  status  quo 
ante  bellum  in  every  detail.  This  step  was 
accompanied  by  the  arrest  of  all  the  leading  Liberals 
and  thus  brought  to  an  end  a  by  no  means  unim- 
portant epoch. 

This  early  constitutional  struggle  brought  into 
being  the  two  parties  which  were  to  divide  the 
government  betw^een  them  for  the  next  hundred 
years.  The  Conservatives  comprised  the  clergy, 
a  large  section  of  the  aristocracy,  and  the  over- 
whelming majority  of  the  nation  :  the  Liberals 
depended  for  their  support  upon  the  middle-classes 
and,  later,  upon  the  mobs  in  the  larger  towns,  but 
it  was  not  until  the  commencement  of  the  Carlist 
movement  divided  the  ranks  of  their  opponents 
that  they  could  hope  for  anything  more  than  a 
temporary  triumph  :  similarly  it  was  the  dissipation 
of  the  Liberal  strength  owing  to  the  failure  of  the 
Republic  and  the  growth  of  Socialism  that  gave  the 
Conservatives  the  opportunity  of  which  they  made 
such  good  use  in  1874.  Yet  the  cleavage  between 
the  two  parties  has  always  been  purely  political  and 
never  social  in  its  nature,  and  many  of  the  oldest 
names  in  Spain  may  be  found  among  the  members 

38 


•t "; 


4    •  %J 


i 


J  ^  'Jij 


'%} 


'^t 


of  the  Radical  and  Republican  parties.  More 
important,  perhaps,  than  the  p6litical  results  of  the 
Peninsular  War  was  the  general  unrest  which  it 
caused  all  over  the  country  :  men  who  had  achieved 
fame  owing  to  the  success  of  their  resistance  to  the 
French  had  no  mind  to  return  to  the  obscurity  from 
which  they  had  emerged  even  if  they  desired  ta 
resume  a  more  peaceful  occupation,  which  was  very 
rarely  the  case  :  it  was  this  class  that  was  very  largdy 
responsible  for  the  disorder  which  characterized  so 
much  of  the  19th  century.  The  war  had  also  gone  far 
to  revive  the  old  provincial  feeling  and  the  country 
had  learned  how  much  could  be  effected  without 
the  aid  of  the  central  government.  It  was  the 
combination  of  these  various  elements  of  discontent 
with  the  remains  of  the  Liberal  party  which 
threatened  the  calm  of  Ferdinand's  reign,  in  spite 
of  the  chorus  of  approval  which  greeted  his  con- 
demnation of  the  Cx)nstitution  of  1812.  The  real 
cause  of  the  decline  of  Spain  at  this  time  lay  in  the 
character  of  the  monarch  himself. 

Ferdinand  returned  to  the  Peninsula  almost 
entirely  unknown  to  his  subjects,  and  himself  real- 
izing little  of  the  changes  which  had  been  brought 
about  by  six  years  of  war.  The  French  invasion 
had  obliterated  from  the  memory  of  most  of  his 
subjects  the  ignominious  abdication  of  the  Bourbons 
and  the  even  more  disgraceful  events  which  had 
preceded  it,  and  few  restored  monarchs  have 
returned  from  exile  wlith  more  advantages  than 
Ferdinand  VII.  Unfortunately  he  was  not  the  man 
to  avail  himself  of  the  favourable  circumstances  in 
which  he  was  placed  :  he  was  obstinate  and  narrow- 
minded,  and  although  in  later  years  he  displayed 
certain  statesmanlike  qualities,  the  period  immedi- 
ately following  his  restoration  was  marked  by 
reactionary  measures  of  a  particularly  stupid 
nature;  unlike  Charles  X.,  Ferdinand  learnt 
moderation  by  experience  but  it  was  not  until 
several  years  after  his  return  from  exile  that  he  gave 
any  proof  of  having  assimilated  the  lesson.       The 

84 


v\ 


^   I  "^^ 


King's  anger  was  principally  directed  against  the 
**afrancesados"  and  the  Liberals:  the  members  of 
the  former  party  must  have  repented  bitterly  of 
the  step  they  had  taken,  for  during  the  reign  of 
Joseph  the  burden  of  taxation  had  fallen  entirely 
upon  them  since  it  was  from  them  alone  that  it  was 
possible  for  the  invader's  government  to  collect  the 
revenue,  while  their  lives  were  forfeit  whenever 
they  encountered  their  more  patriotic  fellow- 
countrymen  :  after  the  return  of  Ferdinand  the 
*'afrancesados"  were  treated  as  public  enemies, 
and  those  who  had  not  taken  the  precaution  of 
following  Joseph  into  France  were  left  to  face  the 
prison  and  the  scaffold.  Ferdinand's  hand  was  no 
less  heavy  upon  the  Liberals,  and  he  made  no 
distinction  between  the  moderate  and  the  extremist 
— the  same  dungeon  held  both  the  Jacobin  and  the 
supporter  of  a  constitutional  monarchy.  Mean- 
while the  prestige  of  Spain  was  rapidly  dwindling 
away  and  at  Vienna  she  was  even  refused  the 
status  of  a  first-class  Power  :  at  home  the  public 
services  were  sinking  into  decay  and  such  improve- 
rnents  of  Charles  III.  as  had  survived  the  reign  of 
his  son  now  ceased  to  exist.  Ferdinand  had  neither 
the  men  nor  the  skill  to  govern  the  country  on  the 
old  lines  and  although  sporadic  Liberal  revolts 
were  easily  crushed  it  became  evident  that  some 
change  must  take  place  before  long.  It  was  not 
the  despotism  of  the  restored  monarchy — Spain  did 
not  mind  that — which  precipitated  the  crisis  but 
its  stupidity,  and  the  first  blow  was  struck  by  its  own 
chosen  implement,  the  army. 

During  the  greater  part  of  the  year  1819  there 
had  been  a  considerable  concentration  of  troops  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  Cadiz  in  preparation  for 
another  attempt  to  recover  the  revolted  colonies 
in  America,  for  the  early  years  of  Ferdinand's 
reign  had  been  marked  by  successful  risings  in 
almost  all  the  Spanish  possessions  in  the  New 
World.  This  spirit  of  independence  had  been 
greatly  aided  by  the  reorganisation  which  had  taken 

35 


I 


'fk 


%  n 


■4'::'. 


!       -     ■*« 


"■    '   « 


■■'*'H 


place  in  the  18th  century  :    previously  the  Spanish 
Empire    on    the    mainland    had    practically    been 
divided    between    the    Vice-Royalties    of    Mexico 
and  Peru,  with  the  result  that  these  territories  were 
so  vast  that  the  inhabitants  had  little  or  nothing  in 
common  with  one  another ;  under  the  new  arrange- 
ment, however,  there  were  four  Vice-Royalties— 
Mexico,  New  Granada,  Peru,  and  the  River  Plate 
—and  the  same  number  of  Captaincies-General— 
Guatemala,  Venezuela,  Chile,  and  Cuba  :    this  re- 
distribution created  smaller  districts  whose  popula- 
tion gradually  began  to  think  and  act  as  a  whole  in 
a   way   that   was   quite   impossible   under   the   old 
system.        Even  in   the   18th   century   there   were 
numerous  risings  against  governments  by  Viceroys 
and  Audiencias  and  once  or  twice  against  Spanish 
sovereignity  itself  :  Aranda,  the  minister  of  Charles 
III.,  realised  the  danger  and  in  1783  made  the  inter- 
esting suggestion   that  three   kingdoms   should  be 
created  in  Spanish  America  for  the  Infants  and  that 
the  King  of  Spain  should  take  the  title  of  Emperor  : 
this  plan  was  never  adopted  nor  was  a  similar  pro- 
posal of   Godoy,'and  when   Spanish   control   was 
relaxed  as  a  result  of  Napoleon's  invasion  of  the 
Peninsula  the  angien  regime  was  still  in  full  swing. 
The  example  of  the  United  States  was  always  before 
the  eyes  of  the  discontented  and  the  ideas  to  which 
the  French  Revolution  had  given  birth  were  widely 
spread  :  the  chaos  in  Spain  from  1808  to  1814  gave 
the  discontented  their  chance  and   the  autonomy 
which    the    colonies    enjoyed    during    that    period 
rendered  a   return   to  the  old   regime  impossible. 
The  three  centres  of  the  revolt  were  in  Mexico, 
Venezuela,    and   the   Argentine,    and   the   struggle 
went  on  from  year  to  year  with  increasing  want  of 
success  on  the  part  of  the  Spaniards.       In   181^ 
Ferdinand   determined   to  make  one  last   attempt 
to  reassert  his  authoritv  and  collected  all  the  avail- 
able forces  at  Cadiz  :  unfortunately,  his  administra- 
tion had  exercised  so  demoralizing  an  effect  upon 
the  Spanish  marine  that  there  were  no  transports 

36 


ft 


available  and  the  troops  were  kept  in  idleness 
pending  the  arrival  of  some  ships  which  were  sent 
by  the  Czar.  It  was  during  this  period  of  enforced 
inactivity  that  the  Liberal  propaganda  was  so  eflEec- 
tive,  with  the  result  that  Riego  was  encouraged  to 
raise  the  standard  of  revolt. 

At  first  the  attempt  met  with  little  success  and 
its  author  was  compelled  to  take  to  flight,  but  at  the 
very  moment  when  the  Liberal  cause  appeared 
most  hopeless  the  towns  began  to  rally  to  it  : 
Ferdinand  was  too  astute  not  to  realize  that  open 
opposition  would  certainly  be  futile  and  might  prove 
dangerous  so  he  took  the  oath  to  observe  the  revived 
Constitution  of  1812.  The  movement,  however, 
which  had  brought  about  this  change  was  very 
different  to  those  which  were  producing  similar 
results  in  other  parts  of  Europe  :  there  was  little  or 
no  popular  feeling  behind  it,  and  it  was  in  fact  the 
first  of  the  long  series  of  **pronunciamientos''  which 
marred  the  progress  of  Spain  throughout  so  large  a 
part  of  the  19th  century  :  Riego's  rising  formed  a 
precedent  of  a  particularly  dangerous  kind  and  it 
was  one  that  was  to  be  followed  frequently  in  the 
near  future.  Moreover  the  Liberals  had  changed 
considerably  since  1814  :  persecution  and  exile 
had  embittered  their  feelings  and  their  Left  wing — 
the  **exaltados" — made  little  secret  of  their 
suspicion  of  Ferdinand  ;  indeed  it  was  at  this  time 
that  the  person  of  the  monarch  ceased  to  be  the 
object  of  reverence  which  it  had  been  for  centuries, 
and  it  became  the  declared  object  of  a  definite 
party  in  the  state  to  decry  the  occupants  of  the 
throne.  The  Cortes  met  in  July  and  among  its 
members  were  thirty  deputies  who  had  been  chosen 
in  Spain  to  represent  the  American  colonies, 
although  most  of  them  had  already  asserted  their 
independence.  At  first  men  of  moderate  views 
were  in  the  majority  but,  as  is  almost  invariably  the 
case  in  all  revolutionary  movements,  the  power 
soon  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  extremists.  Riego 
w^as  the  hero  of  the  Radical  mobs  and  the  position 

37 


1   •«  V 


.01 


I 


.  r 


r-:iii 


of  Ferdinand  was  rapidly  approximating  to  that  of 
Louis  XVI.   after  the   events  of    1789,   when   the 
Liberal  attack  on  the  Church  gave  the  Royalists  an 
opportunity    of    recovering    much    of    the    ground 
which  they  had  lost.     To  the  political  demands  of 
the  Liberals  the  majority  of  the  nation  was  com- 
pletely indifferent  and  those  who  took  any  interest 
in  such  matters  probably  supported  the  reformers, 
but  when  the  Church  was  called  into  question  every 
peasant  realized  that  a  vital  principle  was  at  stake  : 
the  position  was  the  same  as  in  England  in  the  17th 
century  when  Charles  L  could  get  little  support  in 
the  attitude  which  he  had  adopted  until  the  action 
of  the  Puritans  in  attacking   episcopacy   sent   half 
the  population  into  his  camp.     So  it  was  in  Spain, 
where    Ferdinand's    adherents    formed    the    Junta 
Apostolica     and     commenced     to     harrass     their 
opponents  at  all  points.       Meanwhile  the  situation 
had  attracted  the  attention  of  the  rest  of  Europe 
and  it  was  one  of   the   most   important   questions 
before  the  Congress  of  Verona.      The  revolutions 
in  Piedmont  and  Naples  which  had  followed  upon 
the  exploit  of  Riego  had  been  crushed  by  Austria, 
but  Portugal  was  very  disturbed  and  South  America 
was,  of  course,  in  open   rebellion.     Great  Britain 
from  the  first  refused  to  interfere,  but  the  Duke  of 
Wellington  probably  gave  the  assembled  strategists 
the   benefit   of   his   experience   of   warfare   in    the 
Peninsula.     The  Czar  was  prepared  to  send  troops 
to  the  support  of  Ferdinand,  but  the  other  European 
governments    disliked    the    idea    of    large    Russian 
forces  within  their  frontiers  and  the  scheme  came 
to  nothing.     At  length  the  "mandate"— to  use  a 
term  so  popular  a  century  later — was  entrusted  to 
France,     partly    on     account     of     her     proximity 
to   the   scene   of    operations,    but    chiefly   because 
Louis    XVIIL     felt    considerable    alarm    for    the 
safety  of  his  relative  at  Madrid.       In  April,  1823, 
a  large  French  army  under  the  Duke  of  Angouleme 
crossed     the     Bidassoa     and    Spanish     Liberalism 
collapsed  like   a   house   of   cards  :    the   extremists 

38 


>v 


carried  Ferdinand  with  them  from  Madrid  to 
Seville  and  then  to  Cadiz,  and  at  the  latter  place 
they  even  suspended  him  from  the  exercise  of  his 
royal  functions,  but  they  could  only  postpone  for 
a  short  time  the  inevitable  result.  The  French  met 
with  no  resistance  and  were  everywhere  received 
as  friends  :  the  Duke  of  Angouleme  hastened  to 
Cadiz,  and  the  Radicals  realizing  that  their  position 
was  hopeless  allowed  Ferdinand  to  proceed  to  the 
French  camp.     The  reign  of  Liberalism  was  over. 

It  was  not  to  be  expected  that  the  Royalists 
would  immediately  forget  the  insults  which  had  been 
inflicted  upon  them,  nor  was  such  the  case  :  Riego 
was  executed,  and  a  veritable  reign  of  terror  ensued 
for  all  who  had  taken  any  prominent  part  in  the 
events  of  the  last  two  and  a  half  years.  Yet  this . 
period  of  Liberal  predominance  was  not  withoutr!*^ 
enduring  results.  It  had  rendered  hopeless  the 
attempt  to  recover  the  colonies,  and  by  1826  the_ 
Spanish  flag  had  ceased  to  fly  upon  the  mainland  of 
America,  although  Spain  did  not  officially  acknow- 
ledge her  loss  until  a  later  date  ;  but  even  more 
important  was  the  prestige  lost  for  the  throne  by 
the  inglorious  attitude  of  Ferdinand.  He  had 
pleased  neither  party,  for  the  Royalists  distrusted 
him  for  not  combating  the  rising  with  more  vigour 
in  its  initial  stages,  while  the  Liberals  could  never 
forgive  the  proscription  which  followed  the  Duke 
of  Angouleme's  invasion.  Even  the  condonation 
by  Charles  IV.  of  his  wife's  adultery  had  not 
weakened  the  power  of  the  crown  to  anything  like 
the  same  extent  as  did  the  political  ineptitude  of  his 
successor,  and  the  Spanish  people  cannot  be  blamed 
for  the  discrimination  which  thev  made  :  in  a 
monarchy  where  the  sovereign  not  only  reigns  but 
governs  the  private  life  of  the  occupant  of  the  throne 
is  of  small  importance  compared  with  his  capability 
— an  Edward  IV.  is  preferable  in  any  age  to  a  Henry 
VI.  Ferdinand  triumphed  over  the  Liberals  more 
because  he  had  successfully  played  upon  the  fears 
of  the  Holy  Alliance  than  on  account  of  any  merit 

89 


%A 


-  "^ 


4«tt' 


|.g.,. 


■As- 


|»'5|>fiS^' is^  f'-«   -  ■^'' 


.  .L^-.-iWB»wa^-*'3i  5' 


,,3iM-"-  p^ ft^-^-f^ne^i^". 


of  his  own,  but  the  office  which  he  occupied  lost  in 
respect  immeasurably  in  the  process. 

With  the  victory  of   the  Duke  of  Angouleme 
there  began  the  last  period  of  Ferdinand's  troubled 
reign   and— too  late   to  save   the   prestige   of   the 
monarchy— it  soon  became  apparent  that  the  King 
had  at  last  learnt  the  lesson  of  his  repeated  mis- 
fortunes.      When  the  fury  of  the  first  outburst  of 
reactionarv  fervour  was  over,  no  repetition  of  its 
excesses  was  tolerated,   and  although  as  Minister 
of    Justice    Calomarde    vigorously     repressed    all 
attempts  at  sedition  his  measures  and  those  of  his. 
royal  master  were  not  sufficiently  drastic  to  please 
the  ultra-Royalists :    these  latter   placed   all  their 
hopes  in  Don  Carlos,  the  King's  brother,  and  im- 
patiently awaited  the  day  when  he  would  ascend  the 
throne  of   his  ancestors  in   place  of   the   childless 
Ferdinand.      A  situation  had  thus  arisen  similar  to 
that  by  which  France  was  at  the  same  moment  being 
faced:     Ferdinand    was    compelled    to    hold    the 
balance    between    the    Constitutionalists  .and    the 
Absolutists  in  exactly  the  same  way  as  Louis  XV  lit. 
was  doing  on  the  other  side  of  the  Pyrenees,  or  as 
Charles  II.  of  England  had  done  a  century  and  a 
half    earlier.      Yet    Don    Carlos    was    a    far   finer 
character  than  either  the  Comte  d  Artois  or  James, 
Duke  of  York  :    he  firmly  believed  in  the  Divine 
Right  of  Kings  but  he  was  perfectly  prepared  to 
wait  for  his  brother's  death  before  attempting  to 
put  his  ideas  into  practice,  and  he  was  m  no  way 
connected  with  the  various  plots  which  were  con- 
tinually being  hatched  in  his  name.     The  hopes  of 
the  extreme  Right  were,  however    doomed  to  be 
disappointed  for  in  1830  Ferdinand  married  as  his 
fourth  wife  Maria  Cristina  of  Naples,  and  ere  long 
it  was  announced  that  the  queen  was  pregnant. 

This  event  at  once  raised  a  constitutional  ques- 
tion of  the  first  importance,  and  to  understand 
thoroughlv  the  political  and  personal  passions  to 
which  it  gave  rise  it  is  necessary  to  remember  that 
the  principle  of  the  succession  to  the  Spanish  throne 

40 


A 


^ 


had  not  at  that  time  been  settled  beyond  all  question- 
— in  fact  the  very  reverse  was  the  case.  The  Siete 
Partidas  had  recognised  the  right  of  females  to 
succeed  to  the  throne  of  Castile  and  Leon  in  default 
of  male  heirs  of  an  equally  near  degree  of  consan- 
guinity, and  that  this  light  had  also  been  admitted 
in  practice  is  proved  by  the  succession  of  Isabella 
I.,  while  that  of  Charles  1.,  whose  claim  was  through 
his  mother  Juana  the  Mad,  shows  that  it  was  allowed 
in  the  case  of  Aragon  also.  Philip  V.,  however, 
introduced  the  Salic  Law  in  1713  and  it  was  upon 
this  that  Don  Carlos  based  his  claim  in  the  event 
of  the  expected  infant  being  a  girl  :  in  reply  it  was 
asserted  that  in  1789  Charies  IV.  for  some  unknown 
reason  had  convoked  the  Cortes  in  secret  session 
and  on  his  initiative  a  resolution  had  been  passed 
requesting  him  to  revert  to  the  old  order  of 
succession  ;  this  decree  had  never  been  promul- 
gated. In  March,  1830,  Ferdinand  under  the 
influence  of  his  wife  piomulgated  the  Pragmatic 
Sanction  of  Charles  IV.  and  in  June  of  the  same 
year  he  made  a  will  in  which  he  left  the  crown  to 
the  child  which  was  about  to  be  born  :  Don  Carlos 
at  once  protested,  not  against  the  principle  of 
leaving  the  crown  by  will  for  it  was  owing  to  a  similar 
action  on  the  part  of  Chailes  II.  that  the  House  of 
Bourbon  had  ascended  the  throne  of  Spain,  but 
against  the  promulgation  of  the  Pragmatic  Sanction 
by  which  alone  the  will  had  the  power  of  placing 
the  crown  upon  the  head  of  a  woman.  Ferdinand 
at  one  time  gave  way  and  revoked  the  Pragmatic 
Sanction,  but  under  the  influence  of  Cristina  he 
destroyed  the  revocation,  while  the  birth  of  Isabella 
made  it  clear  that  the  question  would  have  to  be 
fought  to  a  finish.  The  Cortes  in  its  old  form 
recognised  the  Infanta  as  heiress-apparent,  but  the 
position  in  Portugal  where  a  civil  war  was  taking 
place  between  uncle  and  niece  over  exactly  the  same 
question  left  little  room  for  doubt  that  the  death  of 
the  King  would  be  followed  by  an  attempt  on  the 
part  of  the  Carlists  to  seize  the  reins  of  power  ;  in 

41 


'^i^Mr 


'<        '■?- 


-3  ?s 

4    ' 


'■* 


-*^- 

't^" 


i   jirii 


SS«5' 


f 


42 


the  meantime  whatever  the  threats  of  his  followers 
the  attitude  of  Don  Carlos  himself  was  perfectly 
correct,  and  to  avoid  any  trouble  during  the 
remainder  of  his  brother's  lifetime  he  withdrew 
from  the  country. 

Abroad  the  last  years  of  Ferdinand's  reign  were       tr- 
equally  disturbed.       The  Three  Glorious  Days  of 
1830      had    overthrown    legitimate    monarchy    m 
France,  and  thus  deprived  the  Spanish  Bourbons  of 
a  support  which  had  proved  their  salvation  seven 
years  earlier  :  in  fact  the  position  was  now  reversed 
and   the   French   Royalists  looked  to  the   King  of 
Spain  for  aid  against  their  domestic  enemies,  while 
Louis  Philippe  in  return  began  to  intrigue  with  the 
Liberals  in  the  Peninsula  and  to  aftord  a  refuge  to 
those  who  had  been  exiled  by  Ferdinand.     All  the 
American  colonies  on  the  mainland  had  long  been 
lost    and    only    Cuba    and    the    Philippine    Islands       i 
remained  of  the  vast  dominions  of  Charles  L  and 
Philip  IL       The  army  was  in  little  better  a  plight 
than  it  had  been  in  the  days  of  the  last  Hapsburg, 
while  to  such  a  condition  had  the  navy  been  reduced 
that  the  Dutch  were  paid  to  protect  the  coast  against 
the  Barbarv  corsairs.    It  was  thus  at  a  time  of  Spain's 
lowest    fortunes    that     Ferdinand     died    on    29th 
September,  1833.     His  character  is  a  most  difficult 
one  to  estimate  correctly,  and  most  historians  have 
been  content  to  describe  him  as  wholly  bad  :   that 
he  was  a  coward  is  proved  by  his  conduct  not  only 
as  Prince  of  Asturias  but  also  by  his  relations  with     ^ 
Napoleon   and   bv   his   attitude   during   the   events 
which  followed  the  rising  of  Riego,  and  a  coward  is 
always  contemptible  whether  as  monarch  or  peasant. 
•On  the  other  hand  the  last  ten  years  of  Ferdinand's 
reign  are  in  many  ways  a  marked  advance  upon  the 
eariier  ones  and  at  times  he  displayed  something 
very    nearly    approaching    real    statesmanship    in 
steering  a  middle  course  between  the  demands  of 
the  Cariists  and  the  Constitutionalists,  but  there  can 
be    little    doubt    that    those    who    hold    Ferdinand      y 
responsible  for  most  of  the  ills  to  which  Spain  was 


<^ 


subject  in  the  19th  century  do  not  greatly  err.  By 
his  weakness  and  the  incompetence  of  his  administra- 
tion he  gave  Liberalism  a  raison  d'etre  which  it  had 
never  before  possessed,  and,  as  has  been  frequently 
mentioned,  his  total  lack  of  dignity  went  a  long  way 
to  destroy  the  old  Spanish  respect  for  the  occupant 
of  the  throne.  If  Ferdinand  VII.  is  not  to  be 
compared  with  the  weakest  of  his  predecessors, 
Henry  IV.  and  Charles  II. ,  it  must  be  confessed  that 
he  was  not  far  removed  from  them,  and  the 
difference  is  merely  one  of  degree  and  by  no  means 
one  of  kind. 

The  death  of  Ferdinand  marks  the  close  of  a 
chapter  in  the  history  of  Spain  but  it  does  not 
interrupt  the  sequence  of  the  narrative  :  it  was  not 
new  forces  which  were  arrayed  against  each  other 
during  the  stormy  riegn  of  his  daughter  but  rather 
the  old  ones  in  a  new  form.  The  desire  for 
provincial  autonomy  and  the  consequent  opposition 
to  centralization  were  at  least  as  old  as  Ferdinand 
and  Isabella,  and  that  this  was  the  driving-force 
behind  the  anti-monarchial  factions  ts  shown  by  the 
centrifugal  tendencies  developed  by  the  Republic  as 
soon  as  it  was  established.  For  a  time  the  parties 
became  confused  owing  to  the  pretensions  of  Don 
Carlos,  but  the  death  of  Ferdinand  resulted  not  in 
the  creation  of  new  forces  but  in  the  liberation  of  old 
ones  in  a  new  guise,  which  he  had  succeeded  in 
keeping  in  subjection  during  the  last  ten  years  of  his 
reign.  The  curtain  was  about  to  rise  upon  a  new 
act,  but  the  players  were  the  same  as  in  the  previous 
ones  although  their  costumes  had  been  altered. 


48 


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Uniform  with  this  Edition: 

THE  EARRING 

A  Comedy  in  One  Act 
By  Egerton  Clarke 

2/6  Nett 

THREE  PLAYS 

By  Frances  Petersen 
3/6  Nett 


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